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ABSTRACT 
 
The Basel II accord (2006) includes guidelines to financial institutions for the estimation of regulatory capital (RC) 
for retail credit risk. Under the advanced Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach, the formula suggested for 
calculating RC is based on the Asymptotic Risk Factor (ASRF) model, which assumes that a borrower will default if 
the value of its assets were to fall below the value of its debts. The primary inputs needed in this formula are estimates 
of probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD). Banks for whom usage of the 
advanced IRB approach have been approved usually obtain these estimates from complex models developed in-house. 
Basel II recognises that estimates of PDs, LGDs, and EADs are likely to involve unpredictable errors, and then states 
that, in order to avoid over-optimism, a bank must add to its estimates a margin of conservatism (MoC) that is related 
to the likely range of errors. Basel II also requires several other measures of conservatism that have to be 
incorporated. These conservatism requirements lead to confusion among banks and regulators as to what exactly is 
required as far as a margin of conservatism is concerned. In this paper, we discuss the ASRF model and its 
shortcomings, as well as Basel II conservatism requirements. We study the MoC concept and review possible 
approaches for its implementation. Our overall objective is to highlight certain issues regarding shortcomings 
inherent to a pervasively used model to bank practitioners and regulators and to potentially offer a less confusing 
interpretation of the MoC concept. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
asel II is the second of the Basel Accords and contains recommendations on banking laws and 
regulations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2006). Of particular 
importance is the establishment of international standards that assist regulators in determining the 
capital that banks need to hold to guard against financial and operational risks. Basel II provides risk and capital 
management requirements in order to ensure that a bank has adequate capital for the risks it is exposed to as a result 
of its lending, investment and trading activities. In a retail credit risk context, Basel II recommends that regulatory 
capital (RC) be calculated by following either a standardised approach or an Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach.  
Under the IRB approach, the formula suggested for calculating RC is based on the Asymptotic Risk Factor (ASRF) 
model which assumes that a borrower will default if the borrower’s assets fall below the value of its debts. The ASRF 
model is based on the Merton (1974) model that was initially developed for the pricing of corporate debt. Vasicek 
(1977) showed that, under certain conditions, Merton’s single asset model can be extended to model a portfolio of 
assets. The portfolio model used in the IRB approach (see e.g. Gordy (2003) bears a strong resemblance to Vasicek’s 
model. The primary inputs needed in this regulatory capital (RC) formula are estimates of probability of default (PD), 
loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD). Banks who have obtained approval to use the advanced IRB 
approach usually obtain these estimates from complex models developed in-house. Basel II recognises that estimates 
of PDs, LGDs, and EADs are likely to involve unpredictable errors. It then states that, in order to avoid over-optimism, 
B 
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a bank must add to its estimates a margin of conservatism (MoC) that is related to the likely range of errors. Basel II 
further requires that several other measures of conservatism have to be incorporated. These conservatism requirements 
lead to confusion among banks and regulators as to what exactly is required as far as margin of conservatism is 
required. In this paper we discuss the various conservatism requirements, investigate the MoC concept, and suggest 
possible approaches for its implementation. Overall, our objective is to bring certain shortcomings of pervasively used 
ASFR models to the attention of bank practitioners and regulators, in an attempt to clear up the confusion surrounding 
the MoC, specifically from the South Africa viewpoint. 
 
The layout of the report is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the ASRF model as well as a discussion 
of some of its shortcomings. The Basel formula for calculating RC is reviewed and discussed. Then, in Section 3, 
some background is given regarding the conservatism requirements presented in the Basel documentation. This is 
followed in Section 4 by a discussion of the concept of MoC and the possible implementation thereof. Section 5 
provides concluding remarks as well as comments on recent developments.  
 
2. THE ASRF MODEL AND REGULATORY CAPITAL 
 
2.1 The RC Formula 
 
Regulatory capital (RC) is defined as the difference between the 99.9% VaR (Value at Risk) of the loss distribution 
and the expected loss. The expected loss must be covered by provisioning and the pricing of assets while RC should 
cover unexpected losses at the 99.9th percentile of the loss distribution (BCBS, 2005).  
 
The regulatory capital formula prescribed by Basel II was derived in a wholesale context, and is based on the so-called 
Asymptotic Risk Factor (ASRF) model. This model is derived from an adaptation of the single asset Merton (1974) 
model. The ASRF model assumes that a borrower will default if the value of the borrower’s assets falls below the 
value of its debts. The PD is derived as conditional on a systematic factor – a latent factor linked to asset value. The 
model assumes that changing assets are associated with this systematic factor as well as an idiosyncratic factor that 
depends on the borrower. The latent systematic factor represents the changing economic conditions (the economic 
cycle) which are universal to all portfolio assets. The systematic and the idiosyncratic factors are assumed to be 
independent and normally distributed. The PD distribution for a specific asset class then depends on the correlation 
between the assets of different borrowers as well as the estimated PDs obtained by some model or scorecard. The asset 
correlation (𝜌) is prescribed by Basel for different asset classes, e.g. for home loans 𝜌 = 0.15. The RC is linearly 
related to LGD and EAD and the difference between the expected PD and the 99.9% VaR of the PD distribution. The 
ASRF model is discussed in detail in Van Gestel & Baesens (2009), as well as in Aas (2005) and Annoli, Beccalli, & 
Giordani (2013). Here we provide only the formula for calculating regulatory capital, and assume that the reader is 
familiar with the underlying assumptions and derivation of the model. 
 
The formula for calculating RC is: 
 RC = EAD LGD [Φ 𝜌1 − 𝜌 Φ12 PD +	 𝜌1 − 𝜌 Φ12 0.999 − PD]	 
 
where Φ .  is the standard normal distribution function. Note that the quantities PD, LGD and EAD have to be 
estimated, but 𝜌 is specified depending on the type of credit portfolio. For a loan portfolio, given estimates of PD, 
LGD and EAD for each obligor, the IRB capital charge can be computed by calculating capital charges for each loan 
(obligor), and then aggregating these to arrive at a portfolio capital charge see e.g. Van Gestel & Baesens (2009) and 
Medema, Koning, Lensink, & Medema (2009). Alternatively, as advocated by Thomas (2009) and Crook & Bellotti 
(2010), given estimates of PD, LGD and EAD for each portfolio segment, RC can be calculated by aggregating the 
capital charges over segments. Here segments can be determined as a risk grade (based on PD bands) as suggested by 
Thomas (2009), or by other means using variables such as loan-to-value ratios. This approach is not viewed as a best 
practice, as it can be shown to understate capital as compared with obligor and loan level estimations, a consequence 
of the concavity of the Gordy formula and Jensen’s inequality. Note that the estimation of especially LGD and EAD 
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present special challenges in terms of explainability and predictability. These issues are discussed in detail in Jacobs 
& Karagozoglu (2011) and Jacobs (2010).  
 
2.2 Shortcomings of the Model 
 
The RC formula is characterised by its computational simplicity; however, it has several weaknesses. Below we make 
some remarks about the underlying assumptions and possible limitations of this model: 
 
• The model assumes that the bank’s credit portfolio is ‘infinitely fine-grained’ in the sense that any single 
obligor represents a relatively small share of the portfolio’s total exposure. The asymptotic RC formula 
was derived based on the assumption that all idiosyncratic risk is completely diversified away, which is 
rarely satisfied in practice, due to factors such as risk concentrations and the fact that certain obligors 
have larger exposures. Therefore the RC formula underestimates the capital because any portfolio of 
finite size carries some undiversified risk (Aas, 2005). This gave rise to the introduction of the so-called 
granularity adjustment to the Basel requirements. An improvement on the initial Basel granularity 
adjustment has been proposed, amongst others, by Emmer & Tasche (2005).  
• The model assumes a single underlying systematic risk factor. Such a model cannot reflect segmentation 
effects, and failure to recognise the diversification effects of segmentation could result in the 
overestimation of capital. In order to circumvent this problem, several authors have proposed multi-
factor models (see e.g. Fok, Yan, & Yao (2014). However, depending upon the sensitivities of PD to the 
risk factors, the bias could go in the other direction. 
• The model assumes that the LGD and EAD are both independent of the PD and more-over, that LGD 
and EAD are deterministic (non-stochastic). Several papers have provided evidence that dependence 
exists between loss events and loss given default (see e.g. Pykhtin (2003) and Eckert, Jakob, & Fischer 
(2016). Also, since LGD and EAD are considered non-stochastic, one could argue that the RC formula 
underestimates the capital required to cover the unexpected losses. Although LGD and EAD are 
considered fixed in the original Merton framework, there is voluminous literature that relaxes this 
restriction, see e.g. Jacobs (2011). 
• The different estimates of asset correlation (𝜌), as prescribed by Basel, have been criticised (see e.g.  
Miu & Ozdemir (2006) and Sabato & Schmid (2008).  Although the process of determining these 
correlation estimates is described at a high level in an advisory note (BCBS, 2005), the precise details 
are not provided and the applicability to South African markets has not been established. General 
industry perception has been that these values may have been set too high.  
• The model was originally designed for corporate loans, but the underlying assumptions may not apply 
to consumer credit. Not all borrowers wait until their total asset value falls below the value of their debt 
before defaulting. In particular, many defaulters are those who will not pay despite asset ownership, with 
evidence suggesting that cash-flow constraints affect default in the case of the individual, rather than 
overall asset value (see e.g. Annoli, Beccalli, & Giordani (2013). 
• The applicability of the normal distribution assumption for the systematic factor, representing the 
economic cycle, has been questioned in the literature. Lamb & Perraudin (2008) suggest adding an 
assumption that the systematic factor follows an autoregressive process.  
 
It is also interesting to note that RC is a linear function of LGD and EAD, but a strictly concave function of PD (see 
Van Gestel & Baesens (2009). Figure 1 below illustrates this for different levels of LGD and PD when taking EAD =1 and 𝜌 = 0.15. The RC increases up to a PD of about 11%, after which it decreases. 
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Figure 1. RC curves per unit of EAD as a function of PD and LGD at 𝜌 = 0.15. 
 
 
 
Table 1 below presents the PD at which the maximum RC would occur for a given asset correlation. This characteristic 
will be discussed in more detail in Section 4. For more detail on the behaviour of the RC formula, the interested reader 
is referred to Van Gestel & Baesens (2009) and Thomas (2009).  
 
We will now discuss briefly how the inputs for the RC formula may be obtained. We assume the reader will have 
knowledge of the inputs (PD, LGD, EAD) as described in e.g. Thomas (2009) and Anderson (2007).  For practical 
guidelines, specifically in the course of implementing the Basel II framework, see OeNB/FMA (2004). 
 
 
Table 1. PD at which the maximum RC is obtained as a function of asset correlation. 
Asset correlation (𝜌) PD resulting in max RC 
0.00 0.30 
0.01 0.25 
0.05 0.20 
0.10 0.15 
0.15 0.11 
0.20 0.10 
0.30 0.05 
0.40 0.03 
0.50 0.00 
0.60 0.00 
 
 
2.3 Models for estimating PD  
 
The BCBS (2005) stipulates that the PD input into the RC formula should be so-called through-the-cycle PD (TTC 
PD) predictions. The TTC PD’s should be estimated so that they reflect the expected default rate of an obligor over a 
period of time covering at least one full economic cycle. Technically, the PD is the centrality parameter of the default 
distribution, obtained through inverting the ASRF formula, so average default rates are only approximations to this. 
BCBS (2006) specifies that the PD inputs must be a long-run average of one-year default rates. The Federal Reserve 
in their Joint Final Rule pertaining to the Basel II Capital Accord (see Attachment 1, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (2007), further specifies that this long-run average should be obtained over a mix of economic 
conditions that includes economic downturn conditions. 
 
Using these PD’s as input into the RC formula will lead to far less volatility in the RC estimate than the use of point 
in time PD’s (PIT PD). Since PIT PD’s assess the risk at a particular point in time, the borrower will move up or down 
rating grades through the economic cycle. Another approach would be the direct estimation of TTC PD’s through 
structural models. In the basic ASRF model this is straightforward, and in many extensions not that much more 
computationally burdensome. It should be noted that under the basic ASRF model the long run default rates are good 
approximations.  Some banks in South Africa have started modelling TTC PD directly.  Under this approach, structural 
models are built by utilising macro-economic variables and non-cyclical risk drivers to predict default rates (TTC 
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PD’s) over an economic cycle (see e.g. Eckert, Jakob, & Fischer (2016) for a corporate example of such a structural 
model). Data related to default rates and explanatory economic variables have to be collected over at least an entire 
economic cycle, and even if such data are available, challenges arise as a result of product changes and structural 
changes in the economic or financial system during the period under consideration (see e.g. Ingolfsson & Elvarsson 
(2010). 
 
Due to the above-mentioned difficulties it has become more popular to model the TTC PD by first estimating PIT PD 
for each portfolio segment and then transforming (or smoothing) this estimate to a TTC PD (see Thomas (2009). This 
approach is motivated by the fact that all banks have spent a considerable amount of time building and validating PIT 
PD models (see the paragraph below for more discussion on PIT PD models). The UK financial regulator, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), propagate the use of a variable scaling factor methodology in two memoranda, FSA (2007) 
and (2009). In this methodology, the transformation to a TTC PD is obtained by multiplying the PIT PD with a scalar. 
This scalar varies throughout the credit cycle. The FSA memoranda contain guidelines on the construction of variable 
scalars per segment (e.g. by risk grade), but since the guidelines provided are not explicit, many variants are possible. 
Following the guidelines in these documents, a local bank constructs a so-called TTC scalar in a portfolio segment as 
the ratio of the average long run default rate and the average PIT PD at a specific point in time. For a particular 
segment, the average long run default rate is calculated by averaging the actual bad rate over an economic cycle (which 
must include a down-turn period), while the average PIT PD’s are obtained as the average of the PIT PD estimates of 
the obligors in the particular segment. The TTC scalar is updated on a regular basis to ensure that the recent PIT PD 
is accurately scaled back to the long run average. Some banks implement this on a monthly basis, others bi-annually, 
creating a scalar that varies throughout the credit cycle. Of course, the definition of the start and end of the economic 
cycle is important, as is the definition of a downturn period. 
 
Given the segment in which the obligor falls, the appropriate TTC scalar is then multiplied by the PIT PD of the 
obligor to obtain a TTC PD for the obligor. Clearly the TTC PD estimation approaches followed by different banks 
may vary, which makes regulatory control difficult. A more sophisticated methodology for calculating the TTC scalar 
has been proposed by Ingolfsson & Elvarsson (2010). They use the Kalman filter to extract the economic cycle, which 
is then used to determine the appropriate scalar. 
 
PIT PD is estimated by means of behavioural scorecards. The scorecard is usually built using logistic regression and 
a wealth of literature is available on its construction (see e.g. Siddiqi (2006), Anderson (2007) and Thomas (2009).  A 
PIT PD is typically defined as the probability of an obligor (or account) defaulting in the following year, as estimated 
at a particular point in time. However, such a model could be estimated over a cycle, with repeated observations at a 
one year interval for each obligor, not only at a particular time period. These models are typically built based on data 
representing observed account statuses (default and non-default) for a particular year, by regressing this binary 
variable on explanatory variables lagged by one year. The PD predictions that result from these models are obtained 
at a specific point in time (usually a particular month), do not cover an entire economic cycle, and are typically more 
volatile than the TTC PD’s. The so-called TTC scalar can therefore be regarded as a scalar that smooths PIT PD’s to 
provide less volatile TTC PD’s and therefore smooths out the cyclical economic effects contained in the PIT PD 
predictions. It may be necessary to calibrate PIT PD’s in order to produce PD’s in line with Basel II requirements, for 
example in terms of the definitions of default and time horizon and techniques used to construct the scorecard (see 
Anderson (2007) and Thomas (2009). Several calibration methods have been suggested in the literature (see e.g. 
Medema, Koning, Lensink, & Medema (2009) and Glößner (2003).  
 
2.4 Models for Estimating LGD 
 
Yang & Tkachenko (2012) outline some major differences between PD and LGD modelling. Default events are 
discrete events that follow a Bernoulli (or binomial) distribution, while LGD is a variable that typically follows a beta 
distribution in the interval [0,1]. The LGD is one minus the recovery rate, where the recovery rate is equal to the 
discounted recovered amount divided by the EAD. The LGD is therefore the loss fraction of the EAD, which will take 
several years after default to resolve, whereas PD describes the likelihood of a default event occurring in a specified 
period. In effect, LGD modelling is typically substantially more complex than PD (and EAD) modelling. The sources 
of complexity stem from, amongst others, the issue of developing the LGD measurements in line with Basel 
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prescriptions, the paucity of data in some segments, gaps in risk driver data, the idiosyncratic nature of LGD and the 
challenge of explaining the idiosyncratic variability. 
 
A distinction can be made between subjective and objective LGD methods (Engelman & Rauhmeier, 2011).  
Subjective LGD methods make use of expert judgment and are used for low default portfolios, portfolios with 
insufficient data and new portfolios. Objective LGD methods can be classified into explicit (estimating LGD directly) 
and implicit methods (estimating LGD indirectly by using sub models). Explicit methods allow for the direct 
computation of LGDs, whereas with implicit methods LGD information can only be extracted by applying applicable 
procedures. Examples of explicit methods are the market LGD and the workout LGD approaches (see e.g. Hlawatsch 
& Reichling (2010) while implied market LGD and implied historical LGD are classified as implicit methods (see 
Engelman & Rauhmeier (2011).  The market LGD and implied market LGD approaches are popular in a wholesale 
context and are not readily applicable in a retail context; therefore, we will only describe the workout LGD and the 
implied historical LGD approaches below. 
 
The workout LGD is a cashflow-oriented explicit method and is typically applied when estimating LGD for unsecured 
retail products (Witzany, 2012). It has also been used for secured portfolios, where collateral information is used as 
explanatory variables for the LGD dependent variable. The workout LGD is equal to one minus the recovery rate, 
where the recovery rate can be calculated as the sum of all future recoveries, discounted to the default point and then 
expressed as a fraction of the exposure at default.  Zhang & Thomas (2012), Schmidt (2006) and Witzany (2012) 
respectively make use of a linear regression, run-off triangle and Cox proportional hazards regression to model the 
recovery rate directly. Focussing directly on the loss amount, Tong, Mues & Thomas (2013) make use of a zero 
adjusted gamma model. In this case, LGD is calculated as the loss amount divided by the exposure at default. 
 
The use of the implied historical LGD is only for retail portfolios that typically consist of secured products (Leow & 
Mues, 2012).  In their paper, Leow & Mues (2012) make use of a combination of a haircut model and of a probability 
model to estimate the loss given default. This approach was followed by a local bank for their home loan portfolio. 
For written-off accounts, the bank estimated the shortfall by using a haircut model and used Cox-type survival models 
for estimating the probability of write-off given default and the probability of cure given default. Both these models 
were then combined to estimate the probability of curing, writing–off, or remaining incomplete. The challenges in 
empirically estimating the haircuts, and therefore in validating such models, have drawn regulatory scrutiny. 
 
Because the focus of this paper is on the clarification of the MoC concept as opposed to a detailed exposition of LGD 
modelling techniques, the interested reader is referred to the papers by Lotheram, Brown, Martens, Mues & Baesens 
(2012), Qi & Zhao (2011), Bellotti & Crook (2012), Leow & Mues (2012) and Witzany (2012) for a comparison of 
LGD modelling techniques.  However, the brief overview presented here does illustrate that LGD modelling may 
involve various approaches, some of which are quite complicated.  As we will discuss further in Section 4 of this 
paper, complexity within any given modelling phase further complicates the process of isolating and reasonably 
quantifying MoC.  
 
2.5 Models for Estimating EAD 
 
Under the advanced IRB approach, banks are allowed to use their own estimates of EAD. Conceptually, EAD consists 
of two parts, namely the amount currently drawn, and an estimate of future drawdowns of available, but untapped 
credit (see e.g. Moral (2011) and Taplin, To, & Hee (2007). Estimates of potential future drawdowns are known as 
credit conversion factors (CCFs). Since the CCF is the only random (unknown) proportion of EAD, the estimation of 
EAD ultimately amounts to the estimation of the CCF. The CCF is generally believed to depend on both the type of 
product and the type of borrower. The obligor risk rating has been found to also be a determinant, which will be closely 
related to type of borrower. At present, literature regarding these topics as well as appropriate data sources are in 
scarce supply. However, the BCBS (2005) does offer some suggestions as to which characteristics of the loan and the 
borrower should be taken into account in EAD estimation. Witzany (2011) offers a comprehensive review of various 
techniques for estimating EAD. He also provides a probabilistic definition of EAD, noting that it depends on the 
probability distribution of the time to default (specified as the time between a default date and a retrospective reference 
date), which in turn is determined by the nature of a particular product as well as time from facility origination. The 
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EAD definition leads to the estimation of a "probability weighted conversion factor" by means of a regression 
approach.  
 
The exposure at default (EAD) may be estimated by (see e.g. Yang & Tkachenko (2012) and Taplin, To, & Hee 
(2007): 
 EAD = Outstanding Balance + CCF×Undrawn Limit 
 
where Outstanding Balance is the account balance plus the accrued interest at a reference date, Undrawn Limit (Limit 
of the account minus the Outstanding Balance) is the amount available at the reference date and CCF (Credit 
Conversion Factor) is the proportion of the undrawn limit that is likely to be withdrawn in the event of default.   
 
The CCF therefore represents the fact that if an account defaults in the future, the balance at default is expected to 
equal the balance today plus a fraction of the undrawn amount. The CCF on a non-defaulted facility is required to be 
non-negative and its estimation strongly depends on the time horizon. Since PD and LGD are considered at a one-year 
horizon, EAD should also be estimated as conditional upon default during the same one year horizon. There are several 
approaches, see e.g. Moral (2011), that aim to accomplish this, namely the cohort approach, the fixed time approach, 
the variable time approach, and more recently, the probability weighted approach (Witzany, 2011). 
 
In some instances, the CCF is expressed in terms of the total credit limits (and not only out of the undrawn limit), and 
is then referred to as the loan equivalent factor (LEQ).  Then the equation above changes to:  
 EAD = Outstanding Balance + Undrawn Limit ×LEQ 
 
The LEQ (Loan EQuivalent exposure) refers to the conversion factor on the total limit, i.e. the outstanding balance 
plus the undrawn limit (also sometimes referred to as the “Momentum approach”).   In its simplest form, this equation 
does not fulfil the requirements of the capital adequacy requirements (Witzany, 2011), because it estimates the 
total-limit ratio rather than the CRD (Capital Requirements Directive) -compliant conversion factor, defined as a 
percentage of the undrawn amount (more details in CEBS (2006) paragraphs 299, 305, 306). This has the consequence 
that the currently drawn amount is not considered. However, according to CEBS (2006) the approach may be 
acceptable under specific situations (see e.g. paragraphs 306, 307 of CEBS (2006).   
 
Local banks segment accounts based on limit utilization, making use of the LEQ for accounts with low or medium 
limit utilization and the CCF for accounts with high limit utilization.  Conversion factors (CCFs and LEQs) are 
approximately one when the limit of the facility at reference date equals the exposure of the facility at reference date.  
 
Several approaches have been proposed to estimate the conversion factors (see e.g. Taplin, To & Hee, 2007 (2007) 
and Yang & Tkachenko (2012). Local banks make use of a regression approach, similar to that described in Witzany 
(2011). The long run average CCF may be estimated by the slope of a simple regression of the "Outstanding Balance" 
at default (same as EAD) minus the "Outstanding Balance"  at given reference dates against the "Undrawn Limit" at 
these reference dates. 
 
2.6. Summary of Review of ASRF 
 
The previous section has highlighted various issues with the RC formula and illustrated that a variety of different 
assumptions and methodologies are applied by practitioners when deriving the formula input. The statement from the 
advisory note regarding risk weights is also revealing: "It should be noted that the ASRF (Asymptotic Single Risk 
Factor) for use in the Basel risk weight functions does by no means express any preferences of the Basel Committee 
towards one model over others" (BCBS, 2005). The Basel regulations, therefore, do not enforce the use of the ASRF 
model. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB), however, requires that the RC formula is used for all RC 
calculations. 
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3. A SUMMARY OF BASEL CONSERVATISM REQUIREMENTS 
 
Due to recognition of the issues with the RC formula, as reviewed in the previous section, Basel (BCBS, 2006) 
introduced further regulatory requirements such as MoC and other measures of conservatism. In this section a 
summary of Basel conservatism requirements is provided. The relevant excerpts, listed in Table 2 below, have been 
classified as either pertaining directly to the MoC, or to other measures of conservatism that have to be incorporated 
during interim modelling phases.  
 
 
Table 2. Excerpts from regulatory guidelines (BCBS, 2006; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2013) regarding 
conservatism. 
Source Relates to Excerpt 
Basel II,  
Par 451 MoC 
In general, estimates of PDs, LGDs, and EADs are likely to involve unpredictable errors. 
In order to avoid over-optimism, a bank must add to its estimates a MoC that is related to 
the likely range of errors. Where methods and data are less satisfactory and the likely 
range of errors is larger, the MoC must be larger. 
Basel II,  
Par 468 
Other 
(LGD specific: 
downturn, 
correlation) 
LGD estimates should reflect economic downturn conditions and must equal or exceed the 
long-run default-weighted average loss rate given default.  
Banks are required to account conservatively for potential correlation between loss 
severities and default probabilities. Banks are advised to base estimates on loss severities 
observed during periods of high credit losses or to forecast based on conservative 
assumptions. 
Basel II,  
Par 475 
MoC 
(EAD specific) 
The EAD estimate must be an estimate of the long-run default-weighted average EAD for 
similar facilities and borrowers over a sufficiently long period of time, but with a MoC 
appropriate to the likely range of errors in the estimate. 
Basel II,  
Par 475 
Other 
(EAD specific: 
downturn) 
Moreover, for exposures for which EAD estimates are volatile over the economic cycle, 
the bank must use EAD estimates that are appropriate for an economic downturn, if these 
are more conservative than the long run average. 
Basel II,  
Par 462 
MoC 
(PD specific) 
A bank may use data on internal default experience for the estimation of PD. A bank must 
demonstrate in its analysis that the estimates are reflective of underwriting standards and 
of any differences in the rating system that generated the data and the current rating 
system. Where only limited data are available, or where underwriting standards or rating 
systems have changed, the bank must add a greater MoC in its estimate of PD. The use of 
pooled data across institutions may also be recognised. A bank must demonstrate that the 
internal rating systems and criteria of other banks in the pool are comparable with its own. 
Federal 
Reserve: 
BCC 13-5. 
Conservatism in 
parameter 
estimates 
The degree of conservatism applied to adjust for uncertainty should be related to factors 
such as: 
• the relevance of the reference data to bank’s existing exposures,  
• the robustness of the models,  
• the precision of statistical estimates, and  
• the amount of judgment used throughout the process.  
Conservatism need not be additive for all elements of uncertainty. 
A bank is not required to add a MoC at each step if doing so would produce an excessively 
conservative result. Improvements in the quantification process (including the use of more 
complete data and better estimation techniques) may reduce the appropriate degree of 
conservatism over time. 
 
 
Excerpts from Federal Reserve documents are included in light of the fact that US agencies encourage banks to 
develop estimates compliant with the requirements of the Advanced IRB approach, which could potentially lead to an 
insightful interpretation of the guidelines.  
 
Furthermore, a conservative approach should be followed with respect to each of the sources of uncertainty indicated 
in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3. Mapping of sources of uncertainty to Basel guidelines. 
Source of uncertainty Description Basel framework paragraph 
Data limitations Adjustment to estimates are required to reflect data limitations 411, 460, 462, 475 
Estimation error Certain statistical models produce a point estimate for which the variability is reflected in the width of the confidence interval.  451, 475 
Expert judgment 
Own expertise (e.g. as related to workout and collection 
experience) may influence estimates when empirical data or 
applicable external data are not available. 
460, 462 
Operational changes 
Underwriting standards or rating systems may change over time, 
making it difficult to directly compare data before and after the 
change. 
462 
Model risk 
Any model is an imperfect representation of reality. Over time, 
more accurate or appropriate models may be developed or 
identified. Model assumptions may fail to remain realistic under 
certain conditions.  
451 
Stress testing Estimates should reflect potential adverse economic conditions or unexpected events. 415, 416, 435 
Downturn calibration 
Estimates should reflect the impact of adverse economic 
conditions or unexpected events similar to scenarios that have 
occurred in the past or may occur in the future. 
468, 475 
Wrong-way risk 
Correlations between default risk and loss severities arising 
during periods of stress should be incorporated into prediction 
models where appropriate. 
468, 475 
 
 
With reference to the extract provided in Table 4 below, it may be argued that the requirement for a MoC, especially 
in the case of PD, is unnecessary. The Value-at-Risk (VaR) for regulatory capital is 99.9%, in effect guarding the bank 
against a 1 in a 1,000 year loss. In our opinion, deficiencies in the methodology for constructing a profit/loss 
distribution used to calculate RC are the root cause for many of the conservatism requirements and MoCs for PD, 
LGD and EAD. 
 
 
Table 4. Excerpt from BIS (Bank for International Settlements) note regarding confidence levels. 
BIS 
Explanatory 
Note 
(BCBS. 
2005) 
IRB Risk 
Weight 
Functions  
The confidence level is fixed at 99.9%, i.e. an institution is expected to suffer losses 
that exceed its level of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital on average once in a thousand years. 
This confidence level might seem rather high. However, Tier 2 does not have the loss 
absorbing capacity of Tier 1. The high confidence level was also chosen to protect 
against estimation errors that might inevitably occur from banks’ internal PD, LGD 
and EAD estimation, as well as other model uncertainties. 
 
 
4. MARGIN OF CONSERVATISM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The intent of the Basel MoC requirement appears to be to encourage banks to amend estimates in order to:  
 
• avoid over-optimism, 
• reflect the "likely range of errors", and 
• reflect uncertainty regarding models and data. 
 
This is in addition to other measures of conservatism required to ensure that estimates reflect economic downturn and 
the potential for correlation across risk drivers. While it is clear that a MoC is required and that the requirement may 
be justifiable, a precise methodology for determining this margin is not definitively outlined in the Basel framework 
or associated literature for LGD or EAD (neither of which have an ‘unexpected’ component). The uncertainty that the 
MoC aims to address could include uncertainties encountered with the model inputs as well as with the model itself. 
In attempting to formulate a framework for deriving a suitable MoC based on the above statement of intent, the 
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requirement potentially shows significant overlap with the objectives of guidelines for addressing model risk; see e.g. 
the statement contained in Table 4 (BCBS. 2005).  The 2014 guideline of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System in particular refers to the selection of appropriate goodness-of-fit criteria and the requirement that 
confidence intervals around estimated parameters should be explicitly documented (albeit from an operational risk 
perspective), while the 2011 document (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2011) highlights the 
importance of model validation and on-going monitoring. The latter recommends: ‘an effective challenge of models: 
critical analysis by objective, informed parties that can identify model limitations and produce appropriate changes’.  
 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2013) in circular BCC 13-5 make some interesting remarks 
on the requirement for conservatism to the parameters in the advanced internal ratings based approaches: ‘A bank is 
not required to add a margin of conservatism at each step if doing so would produce an excessively conservative 
result. Instead the overall margin of conservatism should adequately account for all uncertainties and weaknesses in 
the quantification process. Improvements in the quantification process, including the use of more complete data and 
better estimation techniques, may reduce the appropriate degree of conservatism over time’. This particular Federal 
Reserve document contains guidance to promote more extensive analysis of sources of uncertainty and more consistent 
methodological approaches for applying appropriately conservative parameter estimates across banking organisations. 
While the guiding principle is to treat each (input) parameter separately, there can be instances when an adjustment 
applied to one parameter suffices to address uncertainty across multiple parameters for a given portfolio. In such 
cases the justification for applying only the single adjustment should be documented and will be subject to additional 
supervisory scrutiny. 
 
4.2 Possible Statistical Approaches to MoC 
 
From a statistical point of view, two modelling approaches (referred to hereafter as A and B) are possible for estimating 
a MoC.  
 
Approach A 
 
The 100(1 − 𝛼)th percentile of the empirical distribution of the prediction errors could be used, where the latter is 
obtained by comparing actual realisations with predicted values. 
 
Approach B 
 
The upper bound of the 100(1 − 𝛼)% confidence interval for the predicted values could be used, usually obtained as 
standard output from statistical packages for most fitted models.  
 
Because the historical prediction errors essentially form time series, an appropriate time series model should be used 
to analyse the data, unless the assumption of independence over time can be confirmed. For each approach, a particular 
value must be chosen for the confidence level 𝛼, a choice which remains arbitrary unless more specific guidelines are 
provided. A further decision left to the discretion of the practitioner is the level at which the MoC concept should be 
applied, for instance: should such a margin be applied for every sub-model used, or should it be applied at an aggregate 
level? LGD models, for example, may comprise various sub-models; hence the modeller must decide if the MoC-
concept is applicable to each model or only to the final model. The dependency structure between model outputs must 
also be considered and a decision must be made as to whether the MoCs applied to each model actually qualify as 
being additive or whether the assumption of additivity will result in unrealistic margins at the aggregate level. This is 
a complex consideration which, if addressed by means of further complex modelling, could lead to confusion and the 
inability to meaningfully interpret the final model output. Furthermore, the downside of this is underestimating MoC, 
as it may be doubtful that there is a diversification effect amongst component model errors. In our opinion, it should 
rather be applied at the highest level possible to ensure ease of interpretation.  
 
The key to assigning the appropriate confidence level may potentially lie in the monitoring process where realised 
values can be monthly compared to model predictions. Based on Approach A, the real test would be to compare the 
predicted RC to the “realised RC”, which will have to be based on RC estimates since actual RC (and LGD) can only 
be calculated for accounts that have been resolved, which in reality will only represent a subset of the full book. In 
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this light the monitoring of actual versus predicted values will have to take place at the PD, LGD and EAD model 
level. The decision regarding the exact confidence level to employ should then be made based on the extent of the 
deviation between the actual (observed) and predicted values. In the light of these recommendations, the next three 
sections deal with the individual MoCs for PD, LGD and EAD. 
 
4.3 Formulation of MoC for PD 
 
In a retail context, we are yet to find a source that provides a clear methodology for constructing a MoC for the inputs 
into the RC formula. To this end, we suggest a formulation for constructing a MoC for PD’s in general, and will use 
this as background for our further discussion of LGD and EAD. 
 
For simplicity, only one risk grade is examined and all accounts in the risk grade are considered together. Let 𝑝@ denote 
the actual observed default rate in period 𝑡 for 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑛. A default rate prediction model is used to determine 
predicted default rates 𝑝@ , for 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, 𝑛 + 1. Rates are observed up to period 𝑛, but the model also supplies the 
predicted default rate 𝑝FG2 for the next period 𝑛 + 1. The problem to be dealt with is to adjust 𝑝FG2 so as to make it 
more conservative, but this is to be done in a justified manner since undue conservatism will have unwanted risk 
capital consequences. Let 𝑙@ = log	(𝑝@ (1 − 𝑝@) and 𝑙@ = log	(𝑝@ (1 − 𝑝@)	denote the log-odds transforms of the 
actual and predicted default rates. Then the adjustment of 𝑙FG2 is given by 𝑙FG2 = 𝑙FG2 + 𝑚 where 𝑚 is the MoC to 
be used. The corresponding adjusted predicted default rate is 𝑝FG2 = 1 (1 + exp	(− 𝑙FG2).	The outstanding 
requirement is a methodology for selecting the MoC. Let 𝑒@ = 𝑙@ − 𝑙@ for 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 denote the errors in the past 
predicted log-odds default rates when compared to the actual observed log-odds default rates. It is possible to fit a 
suitable time series model to the observed errors and to use this model to obtain a prediction 𝑒FG2 of the next error 𝑒FG2.  
 
Approach A  
 
One possible approach would be to take 𝑚 = 𝑒FG2, while an alternative would be a one-sided (upper) confidence 
bound for the next error, say 𝑚 = 𝑏FG2(𝛼) where the confidence level 𝛼 can be selected to control the extent of 
conservatism. This suggestion is especially relevant when dealing with the PIT default prediction problem. The precise 
formulas used here would depend on the time series model fitted to the errors. If testing of the observed errors shows 
that they may be regarded as a random sample (i.e. no time dependence), this approach would be in line with taking 𝑚 = 𝑏FG2 𝛼 = 100(1 − 𝛼)@R	percentile of the sample 𝑒2, … , 𝑒F. 
 
Approach B 
 
If the prediction model used to generate the default rates 𝑝@ is sophisticated enough, it should be able to also supply 
confidence bounds for the 𝑝@′s. In particular, it should give a one-sided (upper) confidence bound, say 𝑢FG2(𝛼) for 𝑝FG2, implying that the extent of conservatism can be controlled by selecting the confidence level 𝛼.  This modelling 
may be done via the 𝑙@’s, but the principle should be clear. The advantage is that only one model (presumably the 
model already implemented) is required, whereas modelling the errors in their own right would require an additional 
model with all the attendant issues regarding model selection to be dealt with. Even if Approach B is implemented, a 
study of the error series may be valuable. For example, a consistently positive (or negative) error series would indicate 
strongly that the basic prediction model has flaws that need to be addressed. Again, if the error series tends to become 
smaller (larger) over time, the basic prediction model must be improving (deteriorating) and this has implications for 
the MoC required.  
 
As stated in Section 2.3, Basel requires that TTC PD estimates be used as an input to the RC formula. The most 
popular methodology currently followed by banks is the variable scalar approach in accordance with the guidelines 
given in FSA (2007) and (2009). In this methodology, two quantities are being estimated, namely the so-called TTC 
scalar and the PIT PD’s. Should MoC’s then be constructed for the TTC scalars as well as for the PIT PD’s? Although 
the FSA memoranda provide guidelines on the choice of economic cycle, measures of conservatism to be incorporated, 
data issues and model validation, no clear guidelines are given to answer this question.  
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As mentioned in Section 2.3, one of the banks in South Africa uses a specific implementation of this scalar approach. 
The TTC PD per segment is adjusted upwards by taking the 95th percentile of observed default rates. This could be 
interpreted as more of a stringent conservatism requirement than a MoC as defined above. Judging by the requirements 
of FSA (2007) close judgmental monitoring of the scaling framework will always be required. Statistically rigorous 
tests can be designed and implemented at each re-estimation point of the scalar to flag suspicious portfolio 
developments and to avoid mistakenly incorporating permanent effects into the cycle estimate (Ingolfsson & 
Elvarsson, 2010). In fact, this is what the supervisor expects most banks to do, at least for some years after 
implementing a variable scalar methodology.  
 
In our opinion, if the FSA guidelines are followed and adequate attention is given to the specification of conservatism 
(such as calculating the TTC scalar using a down-turn period) and continuous model validation and monitoring (such 
as comparing actual default rates with PIT PD’s), no MoC needs to be incorporated on the PD inputs to the RC 
formula. This is because the RC formula already makes provision for unexpected PD’s and model uncertainty, which 
is not the case for LGD’s and EAD’s. Also, the cyclical nature of PIT PD estimates and their volatility further 
complicates the construction of a MoC. Rather, as suggested by the FSA, the effort should be spent on ensuring the 
accuracy of the PIT models via regular monitoring and validation and then, if required, model recalibration or 
redevelopment. Furthermore, as noted in Section 2.2 the RC formula is convex in PD. Suppose we are dealing with a 
home loan portfolio and our methodology recommends the application of a MoC to an estimated TTC PD of 11%. If 
the margin results in a PD that is higher than 11%, the resulting RC will be lower, instead of higher as intuitively 
expected. Although a higher PD would still contribute to the overall capital set aside (in the form of provisions, as 
determined by a higher expected losses) this finding is interesting in the context of regulatory capital, raising potential 
questions regarding the cost associated with holding regulatory capital (set aside annually) as opposed to provisions 
(amended on a month-to-month basis). In the context of a MoC, seen as a factor by which the regulatory capital is 
increased, this finding suggests that the MoC should only be applied up to a threshold of 11% or not at all. Again, we 
believe the answer lies in monitoring the error series continuously (as confirmed by the guidelines given by the FSA 
(2009) as well as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2013) in circular BCC 13-5).  
 
Branco (2011) proposes a model validation methodology for assessing the MoC included in PD estimates. This 
methodology can be seen as a benchmark from which comparisons can be drawn rather than an attempt to quantify 
the margin of conservatism.  As a benchmark, the methodology compares, in each risk grade, the average losses 
recorded (historical information) and the estimated average losses, with the latter obtained from credibility premiums.  
Branco (2011) concludes that differences between estimated and recorded losses should be interpreted as a warning 
sign of possible mismatches in the margin of conservatism included in each risk grade, but should not lead, per se, to 
an automatic adjustment in PD estimations. Branco (2011) furthers states that the assessment of the margin of 
conservatism included in PD estimates cannot be isolated from the characteristics of the sample (in terms of nature, 
availability, timeliness and representativeness) nor from the inherent assumptions regarding calibration, business 
cycle, role of borrower dependencies and results of stress-testing exercises.  
 
4.4 Formulation of MoC for LGD  
 
The RC capital formula assumes that the loss given default rate (which is equal to one minus the recovery rate) is 
known and non-stochastic (Gordy, 2003). It should be noted that during an economic downturn, losses on defaulted 
loans are likely to be higher than under ordinary business conditions. As a single example, it is likely that the value of 
collaterals may decline. In this light, Basel II requires that a “downturn” LGD be estimated for each client/risk 
segment, but do not provide a specific methodology for doing so. Some banks might use a scalar to estimate the 
downturn LGD (similar to the PD TTC scalar approach). Alternatively, a bank can estimate the LGD (directly or 
indirectly) using data from a downturn period.   
 
Banks are required to provide their own LGD estimates.  These LGD estimates will consist of both an average LGD 
for expected loss related to defaulted assets and the performing book as well as a “downturn” LGD for expected losses 
and RC estimation. Sabato & Schmid (2008) also address the issue of estimating downturn LGD. They note that the 
use of downturn LGD is recommended in the Basel Accord for the express purpose of compensating for possible PD-
LGD correlation that would otherwise not be accounted for when implementing the ASRF model.  
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal –Fourth Quarter 2017 Volume 16, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 269 The Clute Institute 
A further regulatory requirement for retail home loans is a 10% floor for the LGD estimate. In the home loan portfolio 
of a local bank, this LGD floor requirement contributes almost 75% of the total RC estimate. In this example, a MoC 
for a secured portfolio would have been unnecessary, given the regulatory floor. Given newly proposed floors, 
significant portions of the book may fall below the prescribed minimum level. As a result, MoC has little bearing on 
risk weighted assets. The newly suggested floors can be found in Table 2 of the consultative paper published by the 
BCBS (2016).  In other situations, MoC might be introduced based on a lower or upper prediction confidence interval 
for the specific statistical model used to estimate LGD (e.g. linear regression, survival models). Note than whenever 
confidence intervals are employed the underlying model assumptions, e.g. the assumption of independent 
observations, must be tested thoroughly.  
 
As stated previously, a MoC may be viewed as a post-modelling add-on to account for over-optimism, uncertainty 
regarding data, models or estimation error, over and above other conservative measures such as the explicit Basel 
requirement that the estimate should reflect downturn conditions.  The adjustment of the downturn LGD scalar, if 
discrepancies are observed between predicted and actual values, may serve as a robust method for ascertaining whether 
or not the implemented MoCs are realistic.  
 
Peter (2011) makes some remarks about MoCs in an LGD context. A too conservative view on downturn assessments 
is argued, as well as the use of empirical distributions and bootstrapping to determine quantiles selected for the MoC. 
Sabato & Schmid (2008) propose a technique in the form of stress-testing for deriving conservative LGD estimates 
where banks lack extensive historical LGD data. The approach applies stressing factors to the cure rate and collateral 
value observed across risk-homogenous loan-to-value (LTV) pools, after which the migration of clients into higher 
LTV pools (due to deteriorating collateral value) is assessed in order to calculate a "stressed LGD". The approach 
results in specific adjustment formulae for each asset class. Although the bank may not necessarily lack historical data 
relevant to a credit event, this approach may be considered as a benchmark for comparison (Sabato & Schmid, 2008). 
 
In our view, since actual LGDs do not exist for incomplete accounts, Approach B should be used for constructing a 
MoC for the estimated LGD. This should be compared with the stressed downturn LGD estimate and the most 
conservative option taken. 
 
4.5 Formulation of MoC for EAD 
 
It is a Basel requirement that the conversion factors be modelled in a conservative way. Basel requires that either long 
run conversion factor estimates with a MoC or downturn estimates must be used for regulatory capital determination. 
In order to make logical sense, all EAD estimates are determined by requiring that conversion factors to be floored at 
zero.  At account level the maximum of the EAD estimate and the Outstanding Balance is taken as the EAD estimate.  
 
When considering the construction of a MoC for the EAD input to the RC formula, the focus is on the estimation of 
the CCF’s. Downturn estimates of the CCF may be calculated using the downturn cycles used for the PD and LGD 
model development. Estimates of long run conversion factors with a MoC may be compared with downturn conversion 
factor estimates to determine the estimates for use in the final EAD RC estimation. Moral (2011) proposes a robust 
quantile regression procedure for determining conservative long run conversion factors for all portfolio segments. 
Witzany (2011) investigates an alternative approach for estimating CCF and gives an explicit expression for 
calculating a MoC for the resulting CCF. Witzany (2011) proposes the use of a 95% confidence interval around the 
regression coefficient CCF estimate, on the basis that a reference period spanning years with both high and low 
observed PD’s would lead to an estimate capturing both estimation error and systemic variation due to economic 
downturn. For reference periods that are not considered representative of the full spectrum of possible PD values, an 
unspecified additional conservative adjustment based on expert judgment or external data is recommended. 
 
Once again, we believe that the stressed downturn EAD estimate should be compared with the MoC, using Witzany’s 
suggestion, and the most conservative option taken.  
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
A number of regulatory (Basel II) enforced conservative measures have to be incorporated by banks in their retail 
credit models (BCBS, 2006). Above and beyond these measures, it is also required in Basel II (BCBS, 2006) that 
banks should include MoC’s for PD, LGD and EAD models. It should be clear that the myriad of conservatism 
requirements, along with an unclear methodology for the implementation of the MoC concept, contributes to a great 
deal of uncertainty among banks (and the regulator).  
 
We have argued that the PD estimates do not require the MoC add-on and that for LGD and EAD, the maximum of 
the MoC and stressed downturn estimate be used. Also, it is very important to monitor, on a monthly basis, the 
performance of PD, LGD and EAD models over time. This could give the necessary indication as to when models 
need to be recalibrated or when the confidence levels used for the construction of MoCs for LGD and EAD need to 
be adjusted. 
 
On-going sensitivity analyses to study the effects of using different MoC techniques (such as prediction intervals for 
survival curves) and different choices of confidence levels of the existing MoC measures are also encouraged. This is 
confirmed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2013) in circular BCC 13-5, stating “In general, 
conservatism should be applied as a temporary measure while actions are taken to develop more adequate data and 
empirical support. Accuracy and reliability remain the primary goal of the risk-parameter segmentation and 
quantification process.” and also “Conservatism is not a substitute for taking actions to address identified problems 
in risk-measurement processes or data”.    
 
The main point of criticism is that the Vasicek model is not an ideal model for modelling retail credit risk losses and 
is therefore also not appropriate for estimating RC. However, the Basel Committee does not require that this specific 
model be used, and the local regulator could ostensibly be persuaded to employ a more appropriate approach.  
 
In March 2016, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision revisited the use of IRB approaches in the calculating 
risk weighted assets related to credit risk (BCBS, 2016).  The proposed changes to the IRB approaches include a 
number of complementary measures that aim to firstly reduce the complexity of the regulatory framework and improve 
comparability; and secondly to address excessive variability in the capital requirements for credit risk.  Specifically, 
the Basel Committee proposes to: 
 
• remove the option to use the IRB approaches for certain exposures, where it is judged that the model 
parameters cannot be estimated sufficiently reliably for regulatory capital purposes; 
• adopt exposure-level, model-parameter floors to ensure a minimum level of conservatism for portfolios 
where the IRB approaches remain available; and 
• provide greater specification of parameter estimation practices to reduce variability in risk-weighted 
assets (RWA) for portfolios where the IRB approaches remain available. 
 
However, if these proposals are implement, the question arises whether banks will continue to develop and utilise 
internal models as an internal risk management tool without the regulatory imperative. Without the freedom to use 
their own models in the hope that increased accuracy could lead to reduced capital requirements, it is possible that 
banks will see less of a need to do their own modelling for risk purposes, resulting in decreasing levels of 
understanding of the risks they bear (Hastings, 2016). This is a further critique of the MoC requirement, i.e. slavish 
conservatism may be related to lackadaisical modelling practices and less effective risk management. 
 
It is interesting that the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) called the IFRS9 Accord (IFRS, 2014) is 
moving towards a more complex approach for calculating expected loss (moving from an incurred to an expected loss 
methodology), whereas the Basel framework (BCBS, 2016) is now moving to a simpler standardised approach. We 
would like to underscore the importance of ensuring consistency between the accounting and prudential frameworks 
in the light of the IFRS9 (2014) accounting norms. For example, the loss distribution considered for calculating 
provisions (IFRS 9, based on expected losses), should be the same one as for calculating regulatory capital (Basel III, 
based on unexpected losses). If different definitions are used for expected losses, it will become increasingly difficult 
if not impossible for regulators and banks to make sense of the conflicting requirements. This paper has highlighted 
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several issues when models with shortcomings are used to calculate regulatory capital. As soon as the model 
shortcomings are realised, ad hoc measures are introduced to cater for these deficiencies, ultimately giving rise to a 
number of sometimes conflicting requirements that make it difficult for country regulators to enforce and for banks to 
implement in a clear cut way.  
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